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Abstract
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are emerged technology where vehicles and roadside units (RSUs) communicate
with each other. VANETs can be categorized as a subbranch of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). VANETs help to
improve traffic efficiency and safety and provide infotainment facility as well. The dissemination of messages must be
relayed through nodes in VANETs. However, it is possible that a node may propagate false information in a network
due to its malicious behaviour or selfishness. False information in VANETs can change drivers’ behaviour and create
disastrous consequences in the network. Therefore, sometimes false safety messages may endanger human life. To
avoid any lass, it is more important to detect and avoid false messages. This paper has explained some important
algorithms that can detect false messages in VANETs. The categorization of false message detection schemes based
on local and cooperative behaviour has been presented in this article. The limitations and consequences of existing
schemes as well as future work has been discussed.
Keywords: VANETs, MANETs, Misbehaviour, False message detection, Security
1 Review
This article analyses Single/local and Cooperative based
malicious information detection techniques in VANETs.
Single/local based detection schemes are further com-
prised of plausibility, consistency and single node behav-
ior. However, these techniques performances are not upto
themark, because of single node reliance. The cooperative
based detection techniques are more efficient than Sin-
gle/local based detection schemes. The prerequisites for
these scheme need more nodes, unlike Single/local based
detection schemes. These techniques are classified based
on consistency and behavior with neighbors. Trust-based
detection techniques are analysed on previous communi-
cation history. However, these scheme needs a honest and
sufficient number of nodes for reliable result.
*Correspondence: yue.cao@northumbria.ac.uk
3Department of Computer & Information Sciences, Northumbria University,
NE1 8ST, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
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2 Introduction
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have got much
importance for road side safety, security and traffic effi-
ciency in recent years. VANETs have emerged as sub-
class of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). VANETs are
having various differences in properties from MANETs;
therefore, protocols of MANETs cannot directly be
applied to VANETs [1]. In recent announcements from
car manufacturers, they have equipped their vehicles with
wireless access vehicular environment (WAVE) devices.
WAVE protocols are based on IEEE 802.11p standard and
provide basic radio standard for dedicated short-range
communication (DSRC) in VANETs [2–5]. The DSRC
protocol is used for vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle
to infrastructure (V2I) communication [6]. Every vehi-
cle consists of an on-board unit (OBU), which broadcasts
messages about its position, speed and other events. OBU
has the capability to verify incoming messages from valid
entities. Roadside units (RSUs) are fix units which mon-
itor vehicle activities and collect important information
about nearest vehicles [5, 7, 8]. Vehicular communication
consist of two types of messages. Periodic messages show
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presence of vehicle in network and emergency messages,
which are propagated in the occurrence of some damaging
event(s) [3]. Various applications of VANETs exist on road
safety, passenger comfort and traffic efficiency [9, 10].
In the future, VANETs will decrease road accidents by
providing real-time information about traffic and road
status to drivers [9]. The public key infrastructure (PKI)
has been developed for VANETs’ security. The PKI con-
centrates on data integrity and authentication schemes.
It provides traditional solutions for VANETs’ communi-
cation [11]. The certificate authorities (CAs) are respon-
sible for maintaining credentials of vehicles in network
[7, 12]. However, in V2V communication node, misbe-
haviour may propagate false messages, where a single
malicious node may disturb the whole network [13].
False messages in VANETs can create many issues like
higher time required to reach destination, more fuel con-
sumption, higher pollution and traffic accidents [6, 14].
The emergency messages are relayed in multi-hop fash-
ion in the network. Bandwidth may become limited due
to broadcasting of false messages. There must be some
mechanisms to detect and avoid these false messages [3].
A malicious vehicle can broadcast false position infor-
mation in the network that has adverse consequences
in safety applications [15–20]. VANETs’ routing, safety
application, traffic management and data aggregation rely
on correct vehicle position information [21, 22].
This article has investigated current research efforts
on false data detection schemes, like false messages and
false position information detection schemes. This arti-
cle has also described all existing false message detection
schemes. The major contributions of this article are as
follows:
• Local-based false information detection schemes
have been categorized into plausibility, consistency
and behaviour-based detection schemes.
• Cooperative-based data detection schemes are
normally used for bogus information detection. The
cooperative-based schemes are divided into
behaviour, consistency and trust-based detection
schemes. Trust-based detection techniques are
further categorized into direct trust, indirect trust
and hybrid trust-based detection schemes.
• This article has described different detection
protocols and their issues. These issues must be
eradicated to make VANETs’ application more
reliable and safe.
• This paper has bring an analysis of the insight
information about these protocols.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 3 is an introduction to the VANETs. Section
4 delivers a description on secure communication in
the VANETs. Section 5 describes misbehaviour in the
VANETs. Section 6 categorizes cooperative-based detec-
tion schemes for malicious information detection. Section
6 provides a detailed image of cooperative detection
schemes. Section 7 presents malicious information detec-
tion techniques, and finally, conclusion and future work
has been drawn in Section 8.
3 Vehicular ad hoc networks
VANETs are a subclass of MANETs that enable vehicles
to communicate with each other and RSUs. In VANETs,
vehicles act as a router node as well as a terminal node.
The communication takes place in VANETs using V2V
and V2I.
The architecture of VANETs consists of different soft-
ware and hardware components. In VANETs, vehicle are
equipped with an OBU. The RSU is deployed on roadside
to monitor network nodes’ behaviour information [15]
and provide Internet facility access to pasenger on wheels.
The CAs distribute security-related information through
RSU like public key, private key and privacy-related infor-
mation in VANETs (Fig. 1).
In VANETs, communication information consist of two
types of messages, which are beacon and safety messages.
Beacon messages are periodic information which shows
presence of vehicle in network. It contains position of
vehicle, identity of sender, speed and time. Safety mes-
sages are broadcasted in the case of safety event occur-
rence showing location of event [23]. VANET applications
consist of vehicle cooperation for traffic management,
notify drivers about danger on road and provide other
comfort messages for passengers. VANET applications
improve passenger safety, avoid collission, detection of
movable and fixed obstacles and broadcast weather infor-
mation [24]. Road safety applications consist of emergency
electronic brake light (EEBL), slow/stop vehicle advisor
(SVA), cooperative collision warning (CCW), road hazard
notification (RHN) and post-crash notifications (PCN)
[25, 26]. The driver assistance applications warn driver
in specific situations like overtaking vehicles and traffic
congestion. This application category contains toll booth
collection [27], parking notification and congested road
notification(CRN) [24, 28]. The third kind of application
facilitates drivers and passengers while travelling. It pro-
vides mobile Internet services, discussions between vehi-
cles [24] and entertainment [29]. MANETs and VANETs
have some similar properties like self-management and
low bandwidth. Frequently disconnected network, vehicle
density and pattern of traffic flow are well-known chal-
lenges in VANETs. These issues directly effect security
protocols and safety on wheels.
High mobility of vehicles is one of the important fea-
tures, where the vehicle moves with different speed and
direction. Signals fading is taken place in communication
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Fig. 1 VANET architecture
range because there are so many high-rise building,
houses, vehicles and obstacles specially in cities. It may
weaken signal strength as well. High traffic density creates
jam in network which may cause frequent disconnec-
tions in the network. In high mobility VANETs, routing
is a very difficult task because vehicle moves with var-
ious speeds [30–32]. High mobility makes a frequent
topology change in result over a short time connection
that is established between nodes in VANETs. There-
fore, strong medium access control (MAC) protocols are a
prerequisite for effective data dissemination strategies to
enhance throughput and reduce communication overhead
[33–35]. A dynamic topology network is vulnerable to
different security attacks.
4 Secure communication in VANET
Wireless network communication makes VANETs faster,
but evil doer may inject bogus information for accident
and misleading purposes. Therefore, safety of information
has uttermost priority. It is more important that infor-
mation must not be modified or deleted by attacker
[36]. Secure communication have many important met-
rics. In non-secure communication, outsider attackers
try to enter with a fake identity in the network. The
authentication is an important task to tackle because the
attackers always try to authenticate with fake key/ID in
the network. The sender-broadcasted messages must be
authenticated to prevent outsider attackers from denial of
service (DoS) attacks [37], where a large number of mes-
sages are authenticated through group signatures with low
overhead and a timely manner [38]. In this category, there
are several attacks but key/certificate replication, position
faking and Sybil (malicious node create fake IDs and trans-
mit false messages) are considered as critical attacks in
VANETs [24]. The delay in authentication should be as
minimum as possible [39, 40]. Confidentiality is also a
security requirement in VANETs, and it ensures the fact
that data will only be read by an authorized entity. In
VANETs, data are exchanged among nodes and attacker
can get information about locations and privacy related
to driver. It is a difficult task in VANETs to detect an
attack on confidentiality. Traffic analysis and informa-
tion gathering are well-known attacks on confidentiality
[24]. Securing data from unauthorized alteration during
communication in VANETs is very important. Integrity
techniques protect data from alteration, deletion and
addition. These integrity detection schemes are for V2V
and V2I communication in VANETs. In VANETs, an
attack is happened when sensor or other OBU and RSU
are manipulated by a malicious node [41]. Replay and fab-
rication/alteration are well-known attacks in VANETs as
far as integrity is concerned [24]. Fabrication attack hap-
pens when a node creates bogus information in order to
get certain privileges [42].
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Availability of information is an important factor in
VANETs. It enables a system to work all the time and
provides information to vehicles. The goal behind DoS
attack is to bring the network down and unavailable
[43]. Jamming is to disrupt the communication channel
[44, 45]. Spamming are messages that have no useful-
ness for users [46, 47], and DoS are well-known attacks
on availability in VANETs. In [48], insider and out-
sider DoS attackers are mitigated through hash mes-
sage authentication code (HMAC) and threshold value in
VANETs. The drawback of this scheme is that a mali-
cious node can attack with the help of fake messages. In
network security, non-repudiation means to ensure that
the communication entities are original and cannot be
denied after communication happened. Non-repudiation
is normally achieved by public key-based techniques [49].
Manipulated data related to safety and privacy is always
verified for non-repudiation. In privacy, the attacker anal-
yses vehicle and driver information throughout the jour-
ney. The single identity of vehicle create issues for privacy
[7, 50]. The user can easily trace or compromise their
personal details [51]. Therefore, it is more important to
protect the vehicle owner’s privacy. However, for privacy
to provide anonymous authentication with low compu-
tational cost is a challenging task [52]. Therefore, in
VANETs, a set of names are assigned to vehicles called
pseudonyms. The actual identity is only known to CA
that provides pseudonyms. The other nodes and RSUs
only know pseudonyms. Pseudonyms are generated in
such a way that actual identity cannot be predicted
from pseudonyms. The pseudonyms are changed from
time to time specially in mix zone, where nodes are
not able to observe [53]. If there is only one vehicle in
mix zone, then change in pseudonyms belongs to same
node. In [54], a trade-off between security and privacy in
VANETs is proposed because trust information is not use-
ful due to frequent change in pseudonyms from time to
time.
The management of large number of vehicles require an
appropriate security infrastructure. The PKI is a combina-
tion of hardware, software and procedural components. A
PKI provides many services, and the most important is a
trusted third-party validation between the counterparts in
VANETs. PKI ensures its role as a CA. It delivers sign and
keeps digital certificates up to date that represent digital
IDs of nodes. The new vehicular public key infrastructure
(VPKI) uses digital certificate as a rapid authentication
in vehicular environment [24]. There are other security
requirements as well that is handled by VPKI (see Fig. 2).
The above security issues are handled by traditional
VPKI. However, there are insider attackers that are
equipped with valid credentials (public key/private key).
These attackers propagate fake messages in VANETs.
These attacks cannot be detected through VPKI. To
detect fake messages, VANETs will need newly developed
enhanced security techniques.
5 Malicious information detection in VANETs
VANETs uses different applications for road safety and
traffic management. Safety and non-safety information
is disseminated in vehicular network. Therefore, assess-
ment of node behaviour is required for reliable com-
munication. The misbehaviour in VANETs is referred as
a kind of abnormal behaviour of node, and it is dif-
ferent from the average behaviour of nodes in network
[1]. Why misbehaviour happens in VANETs? There are
many reasons. According to [6], the causes of misbe-
havior are divided in two types, intentionally (attacker)
or unintentionally (faulty). The intentional misbehaviour
type is further divided into selfishness and malicious
intent. The unintentional misbehaviour happens due to
signal loss or fault in sensors [5]. The selfishness mis-
behaviour occurs because the node does not want to
utilize its own resources for other nodes in the case of
node centric misbehaviour. While in data centric misbe-
haviour, selfish node broadcasts bogus event information
(like false congestion information) to change the normal
behaviour of other nodes for own benefit. The malicious
misbehaviour (attacker) takes place to disturb normal
operation and produce confusion in the network. The
misbehaviour is sometimes due to signal loss because
nodes leave or enter in the network very frequently. The
limited communication range of node is also the reason
for misbehaviour. The faulty sensor information also plays
a role towards misbehaviour in VANETs [32].
Themain objective is to detect thosemisbehaving nodes
that broadcast fake data in VANETs. Revoking misbehav-
ing nodes is a process which may prevent fake packets
from further participation in network. Detection schemes
are divided in two types, node centric detection and data
centric detection. The focus of this article is on fake
information detection techniques.
5.1 Node centric detection
In the node centric detection scheme, a security model
monitors security credentials of a node, like digital signa-
ture with the help of PKI [55]. The node centric mecha-
nism is precisely concern with a participating agent (node)
in the network. They verify node behaviour by analysing
packet and message pattern. Node centric detection is
divided in two categories, behaviour-based detection and
trust-based detection.
5.1.1 Behaviour-based detection
In the behavioural scheme, looking for a node with an
observable behaviour and extracting a metric that recog-
nizes how healthy nodes behave, for example, behaviour
schemes, may monitor neighbour node transmitting
Arshad et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking  (2018) 2018:62 Page 5 of 17
Fig. 2 Simple VPKI structure
packets whether rates are exceeding from normal rates or
not [55]. In this mechanism, consider howmany messages
in correct pattern (message format) has been delivered?
The main focus of these mechanisms are node-related
information [56].
The abnormal behaviour of a node is to monitor packet
drop or duplication in VANETs. A verifier node is respon-
sible for monitoring misbehaviour. The verifier node is
elected on the basis of their trust value. A verifier may dis-
credit a node that drop or duplicate packets. After cross-
ing the threshold value for misbehaviour, a verifier node
reports to cluster head (CH) and update whitelist(good
nodes) and blacklist(bad nodes). The CH also reports to
CA and revoke them from whitelist. The CA updates the
whitelist and blacklist and broadcast it in network [57].
5.1.2 Trust-based detection
Trust-based detection depends on past and present rep-
utation of node. A node whose reputation is good in
the past is more likely to behave well in the future [55].
The main advantage of trust-based is that it has one step
forward to revocation.
Trust-based system consists reputation system that
maintains a past communication history of nodes. Trust
management also have a voting scheme, where honest
vehicles vote for communication in VANETs [56].
5.2 Data centric detection
Data centric detection focuses on application data from
various neighbours. Data centric misbehaviour detec-
tion schemes analyse transmitted data for possible
misbehaviour. The data is compared with other nodes in
network to verify truism of safety messages. In VANETs,
vehicles propagate different kinds of safety messages for
road safety and collision avoidance. The false safety mes-
sages are considered misbehaviour in VANETs [1]. In data
centric detection scheme, the node searches for possible
evidence to verify application data locally or with the help
of neighbour vehicles. The detection of false safety alerts
consist of local-based detection and cooperative-based
detection mechanisms.
5.2.1 Local-based detection
The local-based detection techniques check each piece of
information independently. In local-based detection, each
received data from same sender will be consistent with
a previous data. These techniques do not rely on other
node response for data detection. These techniques are
further divided into the following subcategories. These are
plausibility checking, consistency checking and behaviour
checking (Fig. 3).
Plausibility checking. In plausibility checking data,
from each node is verified through some predefined rules,
for example, one location is not occupied by two nodes at
the same time. The allowed speed of vehicles should not
exceed that has been established by road authorities. The
movement of vehicle is verified by two beacon messages
which form distance travelled by the node. It is compared
with speed in beacon messages. The plausibility check-
ing model can be used for an expected misbehaviour and
filtering false safety messages. Plausibility model can pro-
duce a valid result in case majority vehicles are not honest
nodes because plausibility checking does not rely on other
neighbour information [56].
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Fig. 3Malicious information detection schemes in VANETs
• Database checking model: To protect VANETs
from false information, plausibility validation in
network is proposed and consist of database rules and
checking model. These rules depend on message
type. A valid message will be succeeded in all
verifications. In order to detect fake vehicle messages,
the rule is vehicle location. It will be in range and
plausible and time stamp will be checked, and also,
velocity should be plausible [58].
• Multiple parameters: For position verification,
plausibility is checked for multiple parameters. The
parameters are called maximum density threshold
(MDT), acceptance range threshold (ART) and
mobility grade threshold (MGT). Messages outside
the range will be discarded. Multiple messages sent
from single location indicates false position. For a
Sybil attack detection, map-based verification and
claim position are used. Map-based assign plausibility
value to beacon messages and compare it with
positions in road map [59].
• Classifier framework: A security framework which
categorizes misbehaviour in VANETs. A different
attack creates various misbehaviours. J-48, Naive
Bayes, IBK, Rrndom forest and Ada Boost1 are used
as classifiers. These classifiers efficiently classify
different misbehaviour attacks. Features related to
verification of position, acceptance range, speed and
received signal strength (RSS) are used to classify
position and identity spoofing attack. The
classification framework is used for different
misbehaviour detections. Multiple classifier creates
overhead and increases computation cost in
detection scheme for single node in VANETs [60].
• RSU-based detection: A centralized detection
approach is proposed for a malicious node that is
propagating false position information in VANETs.
This method develops a series of verifications, which
includes acceptance range verification, maximum
allowable speed check, maximum density of nodes,
speed consistency verification and time interval
substantiation. These verifications are the
responsibility of RSUs to find the legitimacy of node
position. This detection scheme minimizes overhead
on other mobile vehicles in the network. For safety
alerts, position verification is important, and vehicle
will wait for RSU response which creates more
latency [15].
• ELIDV: In efficient and light-weight intrusion
detection scheme for vehicular network (ELIDV)
design to detect false information. The aim of the
detection scheme is to protect network from three
kinds of attacks like false safety messages, integrity
and denial of service (DoS) attacks. The ELIDV
detects false information detection based on a set of
rules. The drawback of this scheme is when the
number of node increases then the detection
performance decreases [61].
Local-based consistency checking. In consistency
checking, each data must be consistent to previous
data, for example, node at location A in first report and
second time report represents location C. The speed to
reach from location A to C must be consistent in the
second report [55]. In these schemes, false information
is detected locally rather than other vehicles in VANETs.
The detection is based on consistency of messages
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from same sender while inconsistency is represented as
misbehaviour.
• Data centric (DC): This algorithm detects false
messages and node’s misbehaviour by observing their
action after sending messages. In the data centric
misbehaviour detection scheme (MDS), each node
locally decide whether information is correct or not.
Consistency-based scheme fails when nodes are at
equal distance from each other. This algorithm also
fails when a node turns around. It detects false
location information. When the vehicle is moving on
a flyover, then the actual distance is different from
the calculated distance. When the vehicles are
moving in a group and one turns to the right and the
others turn to the left, then the vehicles behind them
consider it as a correct alert. When the nodes are
moving in an opposite direction and send false alert,
it is not a selfish reason but a malicious intent. The
second drawback is if a node cannot receive a beacon
after an alert message, so it is assumed as a
misbehaviour, but sometimes, honest cannot send
beacons due to bad signal. Position verification needs
a more efficient mechanism rather than sender and
receiver timings [7].
• Heartbeat-based detection (HBBD): A short-term
misbehaviour detection scheme for node that
propagates false position and speed information
through heartbeat/beacon messages. The observing
node analyse incoming heartbeat/beacons messages
for honest and malicious information detection.
From present and past information, an expected and
observed position is calculated. If information does
not match, the suspicious index of vehicle is
increased. When suspicious index crosses threshold
value, then the vehicle is declared as a malicious
vehicle. The main feature of this misbehaviour
detection technique is low overhead and there is no
need of additional sensors but use of beacon
messages. This scheme looks for inconsistency in
consecutive beacons. This is effective, has low
overhead, and gets misbehaviour detection from few
beacon messages, but beacon messages might loss in
a process which effects credibility [62].
Behaviour-based detection. In malicious information
detection schemes, driver behaviour has a key role. These
schemes monitor behaviour of event reporter. These
schemes rely on behaviour information from single node.
A scheme required little time for detection because it
does not need behaviour information of other vehicles in
reporter vicinity. It consist of techniques that are elabo-
rated below (Fig. 3).
• Trajectory-based detection (TBD): This is a
misbehaviour detection scheme for false post-crash
notification. This detection technique depends upon
the behaviour of driver after sending alert. The
position of vehicle is sensed each time slot form the
time alert received till passed to crash position. The
expected trajectory of event crash modulated
mobility is calculated. The actual car trajectory is also
calculated. If the differences between two trajectories
are above the certain threshold, then it will be
considered as false alert, the reason a car does not
follow the crash trajectory; otherwise, alert will be
considered as true. The main drawbacks of MDS is
that it assumes vehicle position. The other issue is low
threshold which creates more false positive rate [63].
• Root cause-based detection (RCBD): This is
another MDS for PCN. After receiving a PCN
message observer monitor the behaviour of driver for
comparing with expected behaviour of driver, it finds
different root causes based on observation between
two nodes. The node will follow the free mobility
model in case of no alert. The node follows the
crash-modulated mobility model in case of alert
messages. The scheme assumes node will always send
the right location information. This assumption is
invalid because a node can send false location
information too and may produce false results [64].
6 Classification of cooperative-based detection
The cooperative data detection schemes observe node
verification for false information with the help of neigh-
bour nodes. In cooperative data detection techniques,
when the node receives safety-related messages, then it
is checked for data relation with multiple vehicles in
the network. The neighbour node’s conformation about
the safety event will ensure the receiver to accept mes-
sage and notify the driver. The main benefit of coopera-
tive detection is to identify efficiently misbehaviour node
with more confidence. The cooperative-based detection
schemes have sufficient knowledge for bogus message
detection while detecting fake messages. It has produced
low false positive and false negative rates of a node.
The cooperative-based data detection schemes consist of
behaviour-based detection, trusted-based detection and
consistency-based detection, as shown in (Fig. 3).
6.1 Behaviour-based detection
In behaviour-based detection for false event information,
a receiver is compared with average driver behaviour, with
event reporter behaviour at location of the event. The
similarity of average behaviour of vehicles with reporter
behaviour confirms an event. In case of behaviour
difference below the threshold will provide a solid
proof for false information. These kinds of detection
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technique performance rely on maximum number of
honest vehicles in the vicinity of malicious node. The
behaviour base detection scheme is normally used for
verification of false congestion alerts and PCN appli-
cation. It has some detection techniques that are as
follows:
• IDS/RC2RL: An MDS in where misbehaviours like
false position information or intrusion detection
scheme (do not follow known pattern) are tested. In
this case, more density of vehicles the CRL are
compressed through the use of a bloom filter RC2RL
(revocation using compressed certificate revocation
lists). An MDS is to detect false information by
comparing the behaviour of each node with the
average behaviour of other nodes in its vicinity to
build data models on the fly. Moreover, if a true event
appears on the low density, MDS will be considered
wrong. It is bad for safety messages [65].
• Acknowledgement-based detection (ABD): This
scheme consists of false information detection and
mechanism for non-cooperative node detection to
isolate malicious node from the network. A data
packet is used for false information detection. Vehicle
“A” sends information about dense traffic while
another node "B" is moving with an appropriate
speed. The node “B” report that “A” is sending false
information. Another case in same geographic area
that a node sends information about traffic jam while
another node reports high speed is also considered as
fraud. Non-cooperative node is identified through
time stamp acknowledgement packet. In false
congestion, information of a node is also detected
through responses of other nodes in network. A
non-cooperative node is detected through
acknowledgements. The false information detection
technique performance is degraded with a decrease
of nodes on the road. The second drawback is that
acknowledgement process creates a higher overhead
and produce more delay for node and that may be
time-critical messages. For selfish and
non-cooperative nodes, two lists are used, that is, the
individual reputation list (IRL) and the general
reputation list (GRL). The main limitation of IRL is
that a malicious node can insert wrong information
about neighbours without communication with
them [9].
6.2 Consistency-based detection
Consistency-based detection uses consistency data from
multiple vehicles to determine false information. A vehicle
which uses previous average speed of neighbour vehi-
cles must be consistent with the new speed from beacon
messages.
A maximum difference of inconsistency of average
speed will provide evidence of false information [56]. Con-
sistency mechanisms are used when there is a conflict
of information from more than one vehicle. For example,
in the VANET environment, one group of nodes dissem-
inate false road congestion information while the other
group propagate no congestion information. Coopera-
tive consistency need maximum number of honest nodes;
otherwise, this scheme would be non-effective for mali-
cious information detection.
• Detection based on database (DBD) : The first
model proposed for detecting and correcting
malicious data in VANETs. It was a general
framework that is used to validate safety information
based on local sensor data to detect Sybil node
attackers. Each node checks validity of data through a
model. When inconsistencies are found, then data is
considered as malicious. Adversarial model is used
based on parsimony argument for best explanations
to correct malicious data. There is no validation or
performance testing for this approach. To maintain a
global database in VANETs is almost impossible.
This scheme does not provide location privacy. This
scheme will fail when the number of malicious nodes
are more than honest nodes in VANETs [66].
• Detection based six source of information
(DBSSI): A security model enable VANETs to
distinguish false alerts from legitimate alerts. The
detection model is based on six sources of
information. The drive is sent an alert after
agreement of six sources. The filtering model is
dependent on two components. One is threshold
curve (TC), and the other is certainty of event curve
(CoE). The TC depends on distance between event
and driver. The CoE means the confidence of
received message from neighbour node. If the CoE
intersects threshold curves, then the driver will be
notified. The performance of scheme depends on two
parameters which are TC and CoE. The threshold is
important to the driver while certainty of event is
related to event confidence. However, this scheme
creates more computation and delay due to six
sources for false PCN or congestion event detection.
In some scenarios, a threshold may not be crossed
due to VANETs’ characteristics only to analyse or to
endorse the EEBL applications, and no further
applications has been tested or evaluated [67].
• Secondary information based detection (SIBD): A
secondary information is generated in the result of
primary information. The secondary information is
used for detection of primary information. This
scheme depends on how many vehicles generate
secondary information. This means correlated
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information in response to primary information is
known as degree of belief. In the absence of primary
alert, it is also a probability that malicious node send
secondary information. However, in case of true
primary alerts, neighbour node sends large number of
secondary alerts that provide a belief on primary
alert. When the degree of belief is 1, it indicates a true
event. The degree of belief which is 0 shows a false
event; however, the performance of this scheme
degraded due to high speed. The minimum density of
nodes also effect truism of the scheme [68].
• RD4 : The proposed scheme is RD4 which is used for
cooperative deceptive data detection. RD4 filters false
accident in VANETs. Detection of true accident is
handled by accident sources. The car which is actually
involved in accident is equipped with tamper-proof
component to resist against propagation of fake
identities. When accident report is received by
vehicle, the decision is based on the signal strength of
his own observation and signal strength of the same
event of others. In design when accident happens, the
road is black and vehicles slow down. Integrating
both signal strength of events for accumulative signal
strength, if the accumulated signal strength exceeds
the pre-set bound to confirm the event, a velocity
deceleration used as a signal strength and
accumulative signal strength is observed by the
vehicle. An increase in speed indicates low signal
strength which does not produce good accuracy for
false event detection schemes in VANETs [69].
• VANETs association rule mining (VARM) : It is an
introductory scheme for detection of malicious data
disseminated by malicious or faulty node in VANETs.
The scheme builds a mining association role based on
routine messages in VANETs. These messages
provide a relation among vehicles. In high density, a
mining association between vehicles on a single
vehicle creates more computation overhead. It needs
more storage capacity for a single node [70].
• Cheater Detection Scheme (CDS): The Cheater
Detection Scheme (CDS) for a node is a mechanism
that broadcasts fake congestion events. This
approach is based on local velocity and distance with
the help of a radar to verify the congestion event. It
uses a kinematic wave to detect congestion period
and distance. It is a very effective technique against
fake IDs and sent false congestion event because
kinematic wave packets contain signatures and
certificates. In kinematics, a wave packet is used for
detection of non-existing congestion event in
VANETs. This is an effective technique for single
misbehaviour vehicle (cheater), but when the cheater
increases, then the detection process will take more
time because the distance between the leading
cheater and the last cheater increases as
well [71].
• Fox hole region (FHR): A scheme to detect false
PCN in VANETs. MDS is based on FHR event which
happens at a certain location. An FHR is a
four-coordinate region with dimensions depending
on speed of the node. The high speed means larger
FHR, and the low speed have smaller FHR. The FHR
consists of safe and unsafe zones. Two consecutive
beacon messages are used for average speed of
vehicles; after that, a FHR is found for each vehicle.
We find that in threshold D, if the parameter of belief
is between D+ and D-, there might be a misbehaviour.
The information may be correct if it is greater than
D+ and smaller than D-. The FHR help to find a safety
value for the node on his current location and speed.
This detection approach is valid for static event like
PCN. The weight-age information is obtained from
consecutive beacons. In some cases, it is not useful
when an event is near because the vehicle may cross
event location [23].
• Misbehaviour Discovering Method (MisDis): A
misbehaviour detection method is known as
Misbehaviour Discovering method (MisDis), having
accountability of vehicle behaviour by record of
evidence to conform it from inside and outside
vehicles. MisDis has also identified misbehaviour
through inside device (state of automata monitoring)
and supervision. A MisDis also keeps a record
(security log) for behaviour characteristic of target
vehicles. If anything is observed, then a system will
inform the RSUs or other security in charge for
further assistance. MisDis assumes strong
authentication and identification but cannot provide
privacy and practical implementation for
performance evaluation [72].
• Cooperative Detection and Correction
(C −DAC): In Cooperative Detection and Correction
(C − DAC), each vehicle calculates his own value of
flow (speed, density, flow, location information) and
send information to other vehicles. The rest of the
vehicles also calculate the value of Speed, density,
flow and location information. It provides us a good
model for traffic. Each vehicle transmits its flow to
another vehicle. If received flow does not match with
a VANET model flow, then data will not be accepted.
This scheme has effectiveness against node that
shares wrong location information. When a node will
send false information from multiple identities, then
honest nodes that are behind of malicious node ignore
this information because of their own speed. When
multiple attackers send false information, then the
C−DAC scheme cannot detect information as wrong
information. The scheme does not provide better
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result in low density [3]. The scheme performance is
enhanced with IDS (intrusion detection system). The
IDS uses statistical schemes to identify malicious
nodes which broadcast false information [73].
• Subjective logic-based detection (SLBD): A
position verification method by enhancing two
position verification methods and fusing its data in
framework that is known as subjective logic. The
parameters have acceptance range threshold (ART)
and pro-active neighbour exchange (PNE). Both
mechanisms are integrated in the framework.
Subjective logic expresses truth value as opinion
which consists of belief, disbelief, uncertainty and
base rate. Using two methods for position verification
ART and exchanging of table is minimum. Therefore,
more parameter can be used for better results and
low false positive rate in VANETs [22].
6.3 Trust-based detection
Trust and reputation are two important tools of security
that facilitate nodes in decision making of network [74].
Generally, trust is the expectation and level of confidence
of one vehicle about the other vehicle’s action in VANETs
[75, 76]. In VANETs, a high dynamic environment and
an adapted trust establishment are needed. VANETs are
ephemeral kind of network where the connection life is
very short and vehicles meet for few seconds. Decision
about trust of other nodes must be conducted individu-
ally rather than other nodes. Therefore, trust information
is collected from other nodes for very limited time [77].
Trusted-based detection techniques assign value to nodes
based on their past historical data communication [78].
Trust-based detection system is categorised in three trust
systems as shown in Fig. 3.
6.3.1 Direct trust
The established trust is based on mutual sharing of infor-
mation between nodes in VANETs. This kind of trust
does not rely on other node’s trust information. The direct
trust is feasible in VANET environment, but sometimes,
it cannot provide sufficient trust information for false
information detection.
• Particle filter-based detection (PFBD): In this
scheme, particle filtering is performed to check the
plausibility of data and assess trustworthiness of
neighbour nodes. This scheme combines information
from different data sources in one particle filter per
neighbour, for example, position information is
verified through cooperative awareness message
(CAM) by sender nodes and neighbour nodes as well
as with local sensors (digital road map, radar, Lidar,
directional antennas). This scheme is based on the
transition shift between two incoming messages. The
main benefit of this scheme is that it locally assess
trust of neighbour for location verification rather
than other vehicles. The accuracy of scheme depends
on local sensor data and local sensor data effected
from high speed. The drawback of this scheme is
more computation overhead and delay for a single
vehicle [79].
• Behaviour and position-based trust system
(BPBTS) : A method that detects malicious data in
traffic signal at intersections. Node creates fake
multiple identities (Sybil attack) and transmits
information from these fake identities to manipulate
traffic signal. The detection of malicious data with
the help of combination models expected behaviour
of driver and position verification technique. In false
information for traffic signal, control is detected by
control node. The control node assigns trust level to
each node for detection of malicious data. The trust
change (update) after each node’s information is
received. Sending data with a low or zero trust is
considered as a malicious data. In detection scheme,
assumption is not valid for node trust to stop on
green signal because it will not stop on green signal in
a selfishness situation [80].
• Similarity-based trust management system
(SBTMS): A similarity-based trust management
system (SBTMS) checks for bogus safety event
detection in node using similarity index. It assigns
trust to one-hop neighbour in the network. This
scheme also enhances decision-making power using
trust and utilizing echo protocol to check reaction of
reporting vehicle. This scheme is feasible when there
is more meeting time between vehicles for
communication to build a trust system. The second
limitation is when a safety event elevator (SEE) sends
echo safety event alert to a safety event reporter
(SER). If SER does not reply due to signal loss or out
of range communication from SEE, it is also
considered as malicious data [81].
6.3.2 Indirect trust
In indirect trust system, the node shares trust information
of other nodes based on their past communication rela-
tionship. This kind of trust is transitive and effective in
terms of sufficient information.
• Proof of relevance (PoR) : An event verification
responsibility is to put on the reporter. When a
vehicle sense safety event, it must be endorsed from
vehicle in the detecting area and disseminate it in the
network. The drawback is that malicious node could
endorse message with fake digital signature in the
detecting area. Low density of vehicles in reporter
area is also considered as a failure of this scheme [82].
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6.3.3 Hybrid trust
Hybrid trust is a combination of direct and indirect trust.
The hybrid trust system is good for detection rather than
individually using direct and indirect trust, but it con-
sumes more time in detection. Therefore, VANETs need a
short time trust management system.
• Vehicle ad hoc network reputation system
(VARS): A vehicle ad hoc network reputation system
(VARS) uses direct and indirect trust as well as
appended opinions from sources to enable confident
decisions on event packets. The main problem of this
scheme is that it involves accumulation of reputation
evaluation which takes more time [83].
• Event reputation system (ERS): The event
reputation system (ERS) prevents inaccurate traffic
messages in VANETs. A dynamic reputation system
is used to determine the incoming traffic
trustworthiness to the driver. In this scheme, the
vehicle gets enough reputation from inside sensors
and received messages. When enough reputation is
received, then the traffic warning will be broadcasting
to other vehicles in the network. The scheme is
dependent on two parameters: event reputation value
and event confidence list. Event reputation system
consists of three interfaces and four functionalities.
One is event table storage for received messages or
event from on-board unit sensors. The event table
consists of event identity, type of event, time stamp of
event, event location, event transmission range, event
reputation value and event confidence value list. The
event table stores each event separately and set event
reputation value. The ERS uses aggregative event
observation mechanism and reputation adoption
mechanism. The event confidence threshold and
event reputation threshold assess event intensity and
reliability at the same time. The limitation of ERS is
that event reputation value is low in high speed
because of the sensor capability (minimum
detection). The event confidence is small in low
density. The other factors like event duration and
transmission range also have an effect on ERS [84].
• Event reputation model (ERM): An event-based
reputation model is where an event observer node
checks the expected behaviour of event reporters. If
the behaviour matches, then the reputation of event
as well as that of node’s increases. Otherwise
decreases in false information situation. A faulty or
malicious node can inject wrong reputation
value [85].
• Cascading and oversimple (CAO): A misbehaving
node cannot send malicious information at all times
due to selfishness reasons. Therefore, depending on
circumstance in the network, having said that a node
cannot point out all the time a good or bad. Another
issue of trust management is based on the voting
system. The voting threshold value is not reached due
to a constantly changing topology. Another problem
in trust management is cascading (where nodes
influence other nodes in decision-making). The
cascading is solved through a mechanism where
more weight-age is given to a node that is closer to
event location from nodes which are away from the
event location but till there are loopholes. If the
nodes are at same distance from event propagating
different opinions about same event, then the
proposed scheme does not work properly [86].
• RMS: The misbehaviour detection scheme is based
on reputation management system (RMS). The RMS
has three components: misbehaviour detection, event
rebroadcast, and global eviction and filtration of false
information. Each node maintains event information
and a corresponding action for detecting misbehaving
nodes. The detection scheme uses a risk value of bad
node to calculate risk level. The event reporter’s sense
event creates alert and sends it to their neighbours. If
an event observer within one hop of reporter can
observe the behaviour of reporter, vehicles beyond
one hop of reporter participate and can forward the
alert but cannot detect behaviour of reporter [87].
7 Analysis
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of
current cooperative-based malicious information detec-
tion schemes in VANETs. The detection of malicious
event information is very important for road safety and
human lives. This article has categorized data centric mis-
behaviour detection schemes based on their tendency for
malicious information.
Local-based detection schemes rely on available infor-
mation from a single source. Although it is efficient in
term time for detection due to not having any dependance
on other nodes, there is another well-known parameter
for fake data detection that means delay and is experi-
enced in the network due to VANET characteristics. The
delay has various parameters in Table 1. A scheme with
low delay is considered to be fast and vice versa [88].
All mechanisms in Table 1 efficiently detect location of
nodes. However, lack of sufficient information from single
node cannot provide accurate result for malicious infor-
mation detection [7, 62]. The schemes in [7, 62] are also
vulnerable to weak signal strength in detection area.
However, local base detection can produce good result
in low density like [7, 62]. In [63, 64], observing behaviour
of node after transmission of safety message. The main
drawback of these schemes is they assume valid posi-
tion information at detection time. A malicious node
can provide consistent and plausible data to reduce the
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Table 1 Local-based detection schemes
MDS Type Drawback Privacy Delay Overhead (FP) Rate Applications
Database rules [58] Plausibility This model allows
passing fake sign
messages from
database rules.
No High High Min CRN
Multiple parameters [59] Plausibility False position in past
checking might
create false positive
No High Low Max Position data
Classifier framework [60] Plausibility Uses multiple
classifier for detection
No High High Min Speed & Position
RSU-based detection [15] Plausibility Vehicles will be
waiting for position
validation from RSUs
No High Low Min Position data
ELIDV [61] Plausibility Performance
decreases when
malicious nodes
increase in VANETs
No High Low Min EEBL, PCN, CRN
Data centric (DC) [7] Consistency Sometimes, this
scheme cannot
provide useful
information for
detection
Yes Low Low No EEBL, PCN, CRN
HBBD [62] Consistency Beaconmessages lose
due to weak signal.
Yes Low Low Min Position & speed
TBD [63] Behaviour Assumed true
location information
for trajectory.
No Low Low Max PCN
RCBD [64] Behaviour Assumed position
information is correct
No High High Min PCN
effectiveness of local-based schemes as in Table 1. The
accuracy of the schemes is measured in terms of overhead
and false positive rate in worst scenarios. In worst sce-
narios, there are more malicious vehicles that propagate
false messages. The exchange of extra data with vehi-
cles is known as communication overhead. To incorrectly
classify honest nodes as malicious is false positive. The
schemes having low overhead and minimum false positive
rates are normally considered better false data detection
schemes [73] (see Tables 1 and 2)
The cooperative-based detection schemes have more
effectiveness than local-based detection. The neighbour
vehicles provide evidence for malicious behaviour. These
schemes provide low false positive rate than local-based
detection schemes. They accurately detect Sybil attacks.
Cooperative detection scheme creates more overhead
and computation rather than local detection schemes.
The malicious information detection requires minimum
latency as shown in Table 2. The [66, 70] maintain
database for malicious information detection on single
node. A high density network cannot maintain database
on one node. The main drawback of these schemes are
when malicious nodes increase than honest nodes which
creates a false result [3]. In VANETs, low density of
vehicles also decreases the performance of cooperative
detection schemes [9, 65, 68] as shown in Table 2.
VANETs is an ephemeral kind of network where con-
nection between nodes is very short time [86]. Therefore,
VANETs are vulnerable to different security attacks [89].
To constitute trust system is a difficult task [90]. A misbe-
haviour node may not be malicious all the time but due to
selfishness.
The reasons depend on multiple circumstances in the
network. A simple trust model is needed to be constructed
for fast data evaluation in VANETs [91]. In [92], trust
management system for malicious information detection
needs high trust nodes and RSUs. The RSUs already has
an overhead due to other responsibilities. Another issue is
trust management on voting systems. The threshold value
does not reach due to the constantly changing topology.
In trust management system, faulty or malicious nodes
can share false trust information. The single identity of
vehicle create problems for privacy. The user can eas-
ily trace or compromise their personal details. That is a
resaon that a set of names are assigned to a vehicle called
pseudonyms. The actual identity is only known to CA
who provides pseudonyms [7]. Therefore, pseudonyms
are changing after certain time period depending on the
mechanism. The trust-related data is removed due to pri-
vacy issues. For these reasons, VANETs may be needed as
a trade-off between privacy and trust management system
[93]. In indirect trust management system, a malicious
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Table 2 Cooperative-based detection schemes
MDS Type Drawback Privacy Position Delay Overhead (FP) Rate Applications
IDS/RC2RL [65] Behaviour Performance degradation
in case of sparse network
No Yes High Low Min Position data
(RCBD) [9] Behaviour Loss of acknowledgement
due to bad signal
No Yes High High Min CRN
(DBD) [66] Consistency No validation for
performance evaluation
Yes Yes High High Not mentioned Not mentioned
(DBSSI) [67] Consistency Minimum threshold might
create more false positive
rate
No Yes High Low Min
(SIBD) [68] Consistency Malicious nodes can
generate secondary
information in low density
network
No No Low Low Min PCN
RD4 [69] Consistency Degradation in accuracy
due to high mobility
No No Low Low Min PCN
(VARM) [70] Consistency Computation overhead
for single node
No Yes Low High Not mentioned Not mentioned
(DWD) [71] Consistency Detection will take more
time in case of increase in
malicious nodes
Yes Yes Low Low Max CRN
(FHR) [23] Consistency Mechanism uses for static
events
Yes Yes High Low Not mentioned PCN
(C-DAC) [3] Consistency Multiple malicious nodes
can degrade performance
No Yes High High Not mention PCN,CRN
(Host IDS) [73] Consistency Honest neighbour nodes
must be prerequisite for
detection
No Yes High Low Min PCN,CRN
(SLBD) [22] Consistency More parameters can be
used for accurate result
No Yes Low High Min Position data
node can provide bad reputation value for honest node.
The majority of vehicle must be honest for false infor-
mation detection. The trust value is assigned based on
their past history of communication, but unpredictable
behaviour of vehicle sometimes falsifies their past history.
The following prerequisites are required while designing
an efficient trust model forMDS in VANETs [94] as shown
in Table 3.
• Decentralization: VANETs are dynamic and
distributed networks. Therefore, a decentralized trust
management system is required for reliable data
communication. The trust models use one to one or
one to many interactions while trust-building in a
decentralize manners [28]. Some strong
authentications are prerequisite for nodes before
establishing a decentralized trust management
system in VANETs.
• Data scarcity: VANETs have dynamic and
distributed type of network where interaction
between same nodes in future is almost impossible.
Due to short network life, the data received at first
time is important for trust-building.
• Network scalability: Scalability is considered as an
important factor for trust management. The density
of nodes are more, and few of them interact and send
information in the network. The observer need to
quickly decide about the incoming information. The
trust informationmay be updated a little bit according
to the network size. For a good trust management,
trade-off between scalability and trust mechanisms
are required. In efficient trust management, priorities
are given to nodes that are frequently interacting.
• Metric: In trust management, different types of
metrics are used for dynamic trust establishment. The
metrics for trust management system include post-
crash notification (PCN), congestion and weather
condition beacons [95, 96]. In [97], trust management
system is based on behaviour analysis of neighbour
nodes to assign trustworthiness value which is
additionally disseminated in network. The priorities
are given to event reporters that are relatively close to
event location [86] or close in terms of time.
• Confidence: In order to remove uncertainty for
event, trust management requires reliability and
confidence in the VANETs. A trust management
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Table 3 Trusted based detection schemes
MDS Decentralization Data scarcity Scalability Metrics Confidence Security Privacy Robust (FP) Rate Applications
(PFBD) [79] + + + - + + + - Low Position data
(BPBTS) [80] + + - + + + - + Low Traffic signal
(SBTMS) [81] + + + + - - - - Not mentioned Safety event
(VARS) [83] + + + + + - - - Not mentioned Not mentioned
(PoR) [82] + - + + + + - - Not mentioned Not mentioned
(ERS) [84] + + + - + + - - Not mentioned PCN,CRN
(ERM) [85] + + + + + - - - Low Not mentioned
(CAO) [86] + + - + + + + - Low PCN
(MBRMS) [87] + + + - + - + - High PCN, CRN
assigns high trust value to nodes that report same
event [98–100].
• Security: Trust management system requires strong
security credential to authenticate sender that reports
safety information in VANETs [101]. Normally, PKI is
used to verify reporter authenticity in VANETs [102].
• Privacy: In VANETs, decentralized trust
management is dependent on strong authentication
for vehicles while using single key create security
concern to vehicle owners. Therefore, using multiple
keys reduce privacy issues in network [103]. To
protect location privacy in VANETs, many
pseudonym changing techniques have been proposed
to achieve pseudonym changing [104]. In Table 3,
most of trust management schemes have not
provided good privacy.
• Robustness: Trust management system itself faces
challenges of Sybil attack, new comer attack, betrayal
attack (trusted node suddenly started misbehaviour)
and bad mouthing attack (some nodes provide low
reputation intentionally). A robustness trust
mechanism is needed to tackle these kinds of
attackers as well.
VANETs require a quickly responsive detection
mechanism for malicious information detection. New
trust management system is necessary that uses
current parameters in different scenarios for
VANETs. The focus is needed on alert messages
rather than nodes. In VANETs, trust management
system should have minimum information (data
scarcity), strong authentication and privacy and must
be decentralized and scalable.
8 Conclusions
In VANETs, vehicle communication takes place with
each other and RSUs. VANETs have different kinds of
applications for health, safety and traffic efficiency. A
malicious node can broadcast bogus messages, which can
change the behaviour of other nodes. Therefore, detection
of malicious information is an important factor to be
investigated. This article has categorised existing detec-
tion mechanisms in cooperative data detection, local-
based detection and trust-based detection techniques.
Cooperative-based detection schemes are efficient in the
case of dense network and greater number of honest
nodes. Trust-based detection schemes showed good per-
formance when the frequency of interaction among nodes
was high. Trust-based schemes depend on past interac-
tion information among the nodes for better malicious
information detection. However, trust management sys-
tem and local-based detection for malicious information
detection has its own challenges due to VANET character-
istics. The existing detection mechanisms cannot provide
good and up to the mark performance due to various
challenges. Therefore, VANETs require such detection
techniques that should provide data scarcity and have
minimum delay time.
Local node information-based detection techniques
depend on available information from a single node. They
are efficient in terms of time because they do not rely
on other nodes while detecting bogus messages. The lack
of sufficient information from single node does not pro-
vide accurate result for malicious information detection.
These schemes need more information from single node
to enhance their performance.
The cooperative techniques create more delay and over-
head while detecting malicious data as compared to local-
based detection in VANETs. If a number of malicious
nodes increases than honest in VANETs, then it creates
false result for malicious data detection. Low density of
vehicles in VANETs reduce effectiveness of these tech-
niques as well.
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